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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

:
:

Case No. 20030263-CA

ANDREW LUCERO,
Defendant/Appellant

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of three counts of Distribution of
a Controlled Substance and two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance
with the Intent to Distribute. Three of the counts are first-degree felonies. The
other two are second-degree felonies. The Defendant was found guilty by a
jury on August 20, 2002 and was sentenced on December 11, 2002. This Court
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under the pour over provision in U.C.A.
§78-2a-3(j).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE
OF
THE
DEFENDANTS
PRIOR
CONVICTIONS?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision
to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion
standard." State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In addition, this
court should "review the record to determine whether the admission of
[prior] bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in
the proper exercise of that discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d
1120 (Utah 2000)(citations omitted).
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SUPPORT THE SEARCH WARRANT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should "examine the search
warrant affidavit in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion, deferring to
the magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported by
probable cause." State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)(citations and quotations omitted).
III.

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY TO CROSS EXAMINE
THE STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A
SPECIFIC INCIDENT OF UNTRUTHFULNESS?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel

to cross-examine the State's witness about specific

instances of

untruthfulness under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. "[T]he trial
court has broad discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination, and
on appeal the trial court's ruling [regarding the scope of cross-examination]
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Gomez,63 P.3d
72 (Utah 2002)(quotations omitted)(brackets in original).
IV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
WHEN
IT
DENIED
THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be analyzed under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. However, the legal determinations made
by the trial court as a basis for its decision should be reviewed for
correctness. "[W]e will not reverse a trial court's decision [to grant or deny
a new trial] absent a clear abuse of

. . . discretion, but [a]ny legal

determinations made by the trial court as a basis for its denial of a new trial
motion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278, 1282
(Utah 2003)(Citations and quotations omitted)(brackets in original)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 24 - Motion for new trial, (a) the court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party, (b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice.
The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for
such time as it deems reasonable, (c) A motion for a new trial shall be made
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further tiem as the
curt may fix during the ten-day period, (d) If a new trial is granted, the party
shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or argument.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Rule 608(b)- Evidence of character and conduct of witness -Specific instances
of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

A

Rule 609(a)(1) &(2)- Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crimeevidence that a witness other than th accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
Evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with three counts of
distributing a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute. (R. 001-002). The Defendant was
originally charged with three second degree felonies and two third degree
felonies.

The information was later amended.

The amended information

included an enhancement based on the Defendant's prior drug conviction. (R.
064-065). Under the amended information the Defendant was charged with
three first degree felonies and two second degree felonies. The Defendant was
convicted of all charges under the amended information. (R. 392-94). The
Defendant was sentenced to three terms of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison and two terms of one to fifteen years at the prison. The sentences on the
first degree felonies were ordered to run concurrent to each other but
consecutive to the second degree felonies, which were to run concurrent with
each other. R. 394).
<;

Prior to the trial, on March 21, 2002, the State filed a motion in limine
requesting that it be allowed to admit the defendant's prior bad acts into
evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, the
State wanted to introduce evidence of the Defendant's convictions for similar
offenses that occurred in 1992. (R. 109-118).
Defendant's attorney responded by filing a document titled "motion to
dismiss, renewed motion for bill of particulars, motion to suppress and
memorandum in support thereof, as well as, in opposition to State's motion in
limine." (R. 122-136). In this document, Defendant asked the trial court to
suppress all evidence that was found as a result of a search warrant that was
executed on his girlfriend's apartment. The document also asked the trial court
to deny the State's motion to use his prior bad acts at trial.

The State

responded by filing an objection to the motion to suppress. (R. 159-67).
There was a hearing on April 22, 2002 where the State's Motion in
Limine was argued. During the hearing the State argued that they wanted to
use the Defendant's prior convictions as part of their case in chief because it
showed the Defendant's intent. (R. 484/40-42. R. 173-74). The trial court
found that the Defendant's prior convictions were admissible. The court based
this ruling on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and State v.
Ramirez 924 P.2d 366, (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

On June 5, 2002, Defendant's attorney filed a motion and accompanying
memorandum to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence that
was obtained from the subsequent search. (R. 181-191). On June 11, 2002, the
State responded with a written objection to Defendant's motion to suppress.
(R. 200-08). There was a hearing on this motion on July 105 2002. The trial
court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. 213-214, R. 490/31-32).
On July 31, 2002, the State filed a second motion in limine (R. 240-42).
This motion in limine requested that the Court prohibit Defendant's attorney
from inquiring into the confidential informant's criminal record on crossexamination. This motion was granted and the Defendant was prohibited from
cross-examining the State's main witness about an incident where he stole
from his employer and then lied about it. (R. 493/276-285)
A jury trial was held on August 15, 16, 19, and 20, 2002. The Defendant
was convicted on all charges.

(R. 368-72).

Sentencing was originally

scheduled for September 18, 2002. It was continued four times and Defendant
was eventually sentenced on December 11, 2002. (R. 389-392). On December
18, 2002, Defendant's attorney filed a motion for an extension of time to file a
motion for a new trial. (R. 395-97). The State objected to an extension. (R.
398-99). On December 20, 2002, the trial court granted an extension until
December 30, 2002. (R. 403).
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Defendant's attorney filed a motion for a new trial on December 30,
2002.

(R. 407-418).

The State filed a memorandum in opposition to

Defendant's motion for a new trial on January 16, 2003. (R. 419-434). A
hearing was held on the motion for a new trial on January 29, 2003. (R. 499/25).

The motion for a new trial was denied.

The findings of fact and

conclusions of law denying the motion for a new trial were signed by the trial
judge on February 18, 2003. (R. 505-507) On February 12, 2003, Defendant's
trial counsel was allowed to withdraw from the case. ( R. 440-41). On March
14, 2003, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting additional time to file an
appeal. (R. 442). On March 21, 2003, Defendant filed a pro se notice of
appeal (R. 444). He also filed a request for court appointed counsel on this
same date. (R. 447). On May 13, 2003, the Public Defender's Association was
appointed to represent Defendant on his appeal. (R. 471).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Russ Hartley ("Hartley") was a former drug user and friend of the
Defendant. (R. 493/161-63). He contacted Kim Allen from Adult Parole and
Probation about turning the Defendant in for selling drugs. (R. 493/164-65).
Mr. Allen arranged a meeting with Agent Machielson of the Weber Morgan
Narcotic Strike Force ("Strike Force"). (R. 493/165). Hartley began working
as a confidential informant ("C.I.")- (R- 493/166). He assisted the strike force

on four different cases and was paid approximately three thousand dollars
($3000) for the work he did with the strike force. (R. 493/166-67).
Russ Hartley testified that he began working with the strike force in
January of 2001. (R. 493/165-66). He testified that he had been a user of
controlled substances in the past but he quit on November 11 2000 and that he
was not using in January of 2001 when he began working with the strike force.
(R. 493/168, 207-08). Hartley also testified that "I was just smoking a lot of
weed . . ." Id. On cross examination, Hartley testified "that's all I did was
marijuana..." (R. 493/211).
On February 9, 2001, Hartley met with Agent Machielson at the
Cherrywood Condominiums in Ogden, which is where Defendant resided with
his girlfriend. (R. 493/169-71). Hartley called Defendant on the phone and
told him he wanted some green board which was the code word for marijuana.
(R. 493/173). Hartley was given one hundred dollars of strike force money.
He also had a wire on him which allowed the strike force officers to monitor
the conversations between Hartley and Defendant.

He walked over to the

Defendant's residence and knocked on the door. Id. He was allowed inside
and the Defendant got out his scales and weighed out a hundred dollars worth
of marijuana. (R. 493/174).

The Defendant allegedly showed Hartley some methamphetamine and
asked Hartley if he wanted to try some. Hartley testified that he told Defendant
"you know I don't like that stuff."
methamphetamine in front of Hartley.

The Defendant then consumed
(R. 493/175).

Hartley met Agent

Machielson back at the clubhouse and gave him the marijuana. (R. 493/17576).
On February 27, 2001, Hartley made a second controlled buy from the
Defendant.

(R. 493/176). On this occasion, Lucero called Defendant and

ordered a yard of sheetrock which is code for methamphetamine. (R. 493/176).
Hartley went to the Defendant's residence and purchased a hundred dollars
worth of methamphetamine. (R. 493/176-77).
On March 5, 2001, Hartley made a third buy from the Defendant. The
same procedures were followed. Hartley purchased a hundred dollars worth of
methamphetamine from Defendant. (R. 493/179-180).
Hartley testified that he had subsequent conversations with Defendant
where Defendant accused him of being a snitch and threatened to kill him.
Defendant also left threatening messages on Hartley's phone. (R. 493/183185).
After Hartley's third buy, he told Agent Machielson that there was a
substantial amount of methamphetamine and marijuana in Defendant's home.
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(R. 494/118). Agent Machielson prepared an affidavit for a search warrant of
the condominium located at 1120 Canyon road #2 in Ogden, Utah.

The

Honorable Stanton Taylor authorized a search warrant. (R. 494/119). The
warrant was executed on March 6, 2001. Id.
Officers found $1,450 in cash under a mattress.

(R. 494/126).

Defendant told the officers that this money came from his business.

(R.

494/126-27). Included in this money was a hundred dollar bill that Agent
Machielson had given to Russ Hartley to purchase methamphetamine with. (R.
494/127-130). Agent Machielson found some methamphetamine inside the lid
of a can of spray paint. (R. 494/139-40). Agent Machielson could not find any
other controlled substances so he called Russ Hartley. (R. 494/141). Hartley
directed him to a closet near the washer and dryer. Machielson found an army
style duffle bag that contained marijuana. (R. 494/141-42).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There
were several instances where the trial court abused its discretion either by
allowing the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant or
by limiting the evidence the Defendant could present on his behalf.
The first error was when the trial court allowed the State to introduce
evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction for the same offense.

u

These

convictions were over eight (8) years old and were not used for a non-character
purpose. Furthermore, the Court failed to do a Rule 403 analysis to determine
whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.
The Defendant was also prejudiced by the evidence that was admitted
following a search based on a faulty affidavit for the search warrant. The
affidavit

for the search warrant contained information indicating that

Defendant was a suspect in a case that the officer knew was not true. The
affidavit also stated that the confidential informant had been working with the
Strike Force for several years.

The affidavit failed to mention that the

confidential informant was receiving money for the information he provided.
Based on the misleading and omitted information, the trial court should have
suppressed the evidence that was found pursuant to the execution of said
warrant.
The Defendant was also prejudiced when the trial court prohibited his
attorneys from cross-examining the State's main witness concerning specific
instances of untruthfulness. The trial court applied Rule of Evidence 609 to
Rule 608 and did not do a Rule 403 analysis. The Defendant was prejudiced
when he was not able to attack the confidential informant's credibility under
Rule 608.

The final error was when the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a
new trial. Following the trial the Defendant learned that Russ Hartley, who
was the State's confidential informant and main witness, had testified falsely
under oath. Mr. Hartley had testified in another case that he used cocaine until
December 2000. At Defendant's trial Mr. Hartley testified that he only used
marijuana and that he quit using it on November 11, 2001. Both the prosecutor
and the police officer were present at both hearings and either knew or should
have known that Mr. Hartley testified falsely about these matters. Had this
information been brought to Defendant's attention, Russ Hartley's credibility
would have been attacked and his testimony would have carried less weight.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE
OF
THE
DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR
CONVICTIONS FROM 1993.
Prior to the trial, the State filed a written motion in limine requesting

permission to present to the jury evidence that the Defendant had been
convicted of a similar crime in the past. (R. 109). Defendant objected to the
State's motion. (See, R. 122). A hearing was held on April 22, 2002.
The State argued that the prior conviction was admissible to show intent.
(R. 484/41). The State also argued that the circumstances between the prior
convictions and the case at bar were similar. The substances were marijuana

n

and methamphetamine. There were controlled buys made through a
confidential informant. In both cases the Defendant denied that he had any
ownership of the drugs. (R. 484/41-42).
Defendant's attorney pointed out that only marijuana was involved in the
prior incident, not methamphetamine and at the time of the prior incident
Defendant was staying with a roommate. (R. 484/42-43).
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine. The trial court
stated that "the Ramirez and the Taylor case . . . seem to be fairly similar to
what we're talking about here, evidence involving prior convictions for
offenses that are similar to what he's on trial for. And in those cases, the court
said that it was all right to admit the convictions." (R. 484/45). The trial judge
also stated that "I think I'm inclined to grant the motion in limine at this point.
I'm going to allow the state to introduce evidence to the prior convictions only
as to drugs, okay?" (R. 484/47). The Court also acknowledged that those
incidents took place in November and December of 2002. Id.
The trial judge clarified his ruling by stating that:
I just think based on the analysis in State versus Taylor and State
versus Ramirez that were cited in the prosecutor's brief, it's just
the similarities between what he's on trial for and the other prior
convictions are close enough here to - obviously what a jury's
trying to decide here is whether or not the defendant's involved in
the sale or distribution of drugs. And I would think that
somebody's who's claiming that they just happened to be in the
wrong place at the wrong time, that's a little different situation
1A

than somebody who has been involved in selling drugs or
distributing drugs in the past and now is on trial for the same
thing. So I do think it's relevant in this case because it goes to the
question of state of mind and whether or not he knew about the
drugs in this particular case. "I'll grant the motion under 404(b)
and to allow the state to introduce the prior convictions.(R.
484/48).
The trial judge did not engage in an analysis under rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. It does not appear from the record that he engaged in a
"scrupulous examination" of the prior bad act evidence. As will be shown
below, the trial court's reliance on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), and State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) is misplaced.
This prior conviction evidence was highly prejudicial to the Defendant.
It only served to inflame the jury and show that he has a bad character. In State
v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may not be
admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition to
commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states,
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002).
1S

In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d
at 1075.
The incidents that the Defendant was originally convicted of occurred in
November and December of 1992. The offenses he was convicted of in the
case at bar occurred in February and March of 2001. State argued that the
conviction that was eight and half years old somehow showed the Defendant's
intent. The trial judge didn't articulate what purpose under Rule 404(b) the
prior convictions were admitted under.

He only found that they were

admissible.
In its efforts to justify admission, "the State has fallen into the common
error of equating acts and circumstances where are merely similar in nature
with the more narrow common scheme or plan." Id. at 429. The Defendant's
prior convictions did not show knowledge or intent in the case at bar. The
State simply said he did it before so he did it this time. During the prosecutor's
closing argument he argued "[h]e [Agent Machielson] checks out his prior
criminal history and finds out that the Defendant does have a history. He's
been convicted before of distributing a controlled substance. Also, possession
with intent and was convicted by a jury back in 1993." (R. 496/49).

This is not the type of scenario that rule 404(b) envisions. In State v.
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that for
prior bad acts to be admissible at trial, there had to be "a special relevance to a
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the
defendant's predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426.
In State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the defendant was
charged with rape from an incident that occurred in 1987. After the defendant
was charged for the 1987 offense, two women came forward and accused the
Defendant of raping them in 1985. The trial court allowed both women to
testify at the defendant's trial for the 1987 incident.
This Court found reversible error in allowing the two women to testify.
"We cannot conclude that the actions of defendant constitute a common design
or modus operandi. The similarities are common to many assault or rape cases
and are not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct. Defendant's acts
were not so unique as to constitute a signature." Id. at 6. This Court also
found that the prior bad acts were too remote in time. "The two prior acts
occurred nearly two years before defendant was charged with a third, unrelated
sexual assault. There s no apparent connection between defendant's earlier
conduct and his intent in relation to the 1987 rape charge." Id.
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There is absolutely no connection between the Defendant's convictions
for the offenses that occurred in 1992 and the ones that occurred in 2001.
Furthermore, there is nothing that is "signature-like" between the offenses.
The similarities are common to almost every case that involves a confidential
informant. In State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this court
reversed the trial court when it allowed prior bad act evidence at the trial. The
defendant had been charged with stealing a car from a dealership lot. The trial
court allowed evidence that the defendant did the same thing in Virginia.
This Court relied on State v. DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in its
analysis. In DeCorso, there were "numerous" and "signature-like" similarities
between the two offenses. In Webster, this Court held that "evidence of a prior
bad act should be admitted only when it is shown 'that the other act and the
charged offense are sufficiently idiosyncratic that a reasonable jury could find
it more likely than not that the same person performed them both.'" State v.
Webster, 32 P.3d at 987 (quoting United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 53 (1 st
Cir. 1995)).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Defendant's
convictions for acts that occurred in 1992 was probative of the fact that he had
the intent to distribute controlled substances in 2001. The trial court exceed its
discretion by allowing evidence of the prior convictions.
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The trial court's reliance on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), and State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) is misplaced.
In Taylor, the facts are entirely different from the facts in this case. In Taylor,
the prior bad act was twelve days earlier.

The marijuana was identically

packaged. It was divided into one pound amounts and packaged in identical
two-gallon sized Ziploc bags. There were also accounting materials in the
defendant's truck that indicated he had sold one pound to "Gil" who was the
owner of the cabin where the marijuana was found. Id. at 570.
The amount of time in Taylor is different. In Taylor, it was twelve days
versus almost nine years. Also, there were "signature-like" qualities in how the
marijuana was packaged and there was a record found in the defendant's truck
that established a connection to the cabin that the marijuana was found.
In Ramirez, a co-defendant was allowed to testify on rebuttal about other
similar trips she had taken with the defendant to purchase drugs. State v.
Ramirez, 924 P.2d at 368. This Court found that the defendant's prior drugbuying trips to California with the witness were relevant to the issue of his
knowledge and intent. Id. at 369. The facts in Ramirez, are factually different
from those in the case at bar.

The Defendant's convictions for acts that

occurred in 1992 were to remote in time to have any bearing on his knowledge
or intent in 2001.
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A. ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. The factors a court should
consider when weighing the probative value of prior conviction evidence
against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id.
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. It simply found that this
case was similar to State v. Taylor, and State v. Ramirez. The Court failed to
address the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time between the
crimes, the need for the evidence and the effect the evidence would have on the
jury. Since the trial court failed to engage in a Rule 403 analysis, this Court
should reverse Defendant's conviction.
B.

THE PRIOR BAD ACTS WERE TOO REMOTE IN TIME.

The Defendant's prior convictions were too remote in time to be
admissible under Rule 404(b). Remoteness "refers to the time between the
prior crime and the offense for which the accused is on trial."

State v.

Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430. The relevant inquiry is "whether the other acts
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have clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the accused at the time
of the offense charged." Id. In State v. Cox, this Court found that the prior bad
acts were too remote in time when the prior acts "occurred nearly two years
before . . ." State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 6. This Court stated that "there was no
apparent connection between defendant's earlier conduct and his intent in
relation to the 1987 rape charge." Id.
In State v. Feaiherson, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Tenth
Circuit Court has developed a rigorous criteria for the admission of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to rule 404(b). The evidence, among other
criteria, ' must be reasonably close in time to the crime charged.'" State v.
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173,
1176 (10th Cir. 1988). See, also United States v. Mothershed, 859 F.2d 585,
589-90 (8th Cir. 1988)(defendant's conviction about ten years previously of
knowing possession of stolen bank funds was not relevant to show intent or
motive in prosecution for aiding and abetting bank robbery and thus was
inadmissible.)
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no connection between the two
offenses. There is over an eight year gap and they are not connected together
in any way.

For these reasons, the prior bad acts should not have been

admitted at Defendant's trial.

C.

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS.

ADMIT

THE

In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be
Sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant in its absence." State .v Bruce, 119 P.2d 646, 656
(Utah 1989).

In State v. Cox. This Court said that "[although the State

presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults."
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7.
Informing the jury that the Defendant had previously been convicted of
distributing drugs was highly prejudicial. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence
to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989).
Because the prior bad act evidence is so highly prejudicial, the Defendant's
convictions should be reversed and the Defendant should receive a new trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
PROBALBE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH
WARRANT.

Probable cause requires a "nexus between suspected criminal activity and
the place to be searched. . . . In making a probable-cause determination, the

issuing magistrate must examine the totality of the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit, including an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge."
United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2000)(citations
omitted).
The ability of the government to search an individual's home should
only be allowed after a neutral magistrate reviews an affidavit that convinces
him that there is probable cause that there is a crime currently being committed
by the person the warrant is addressing. See, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
51 (1951).
The placement of the magistrate between the arresting officer and the
defendant limits the government's arbitrariness which might otherwise occur if
the determination of probable cause was left to the unbridled discretion of the
police officer conducting the search. See, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10,13-14(1948).
In the case at bar, Agent Machielson used the term "Intelligence Report"
to refer to what was in reality an undated, uncorroborated, anonymous report
that was several months old. He used it as the first justification to obtain a
search warrant for the Defendant's residence. (See copy of the "intelligence
report" at R. 198, and the reference to it in the affidavit at R. 194). This
"intelligence report" discussed an anonymous tip that the Defendant was

involved with 154 pounds of marijuana that was found in a storage shed in
Riverdale.
Anonymous reports have a much lower degree of believability than does
a report from a citizen who is named. In Kaysville v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231
(Ct. App. 1997), this Court listed three factors to take into account when
analyzing the reliability of information to police. The first factor is the "type
of tip or informant involved." Id. at 235. Not all informants or tips are equal.
Anonymous informants are towards "the low-end of the reliability scale." Id.
In contrast, a citizen who identifies himself is high on the reliability scale. Id.
The second factor is whether the informant gave enough information to
justify a stop or investigation. Id. at 236. The third factor is whether the
officer corroborated the information. Id. These factors have been extended to
review the evidence provided to a magistrate in an affidavit for a search
warrant. See, State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
The "intelligence report," when viewed in its entirety has the lowest
degree of reliability. The information comes from an anonymous source whose
veracity and reasons for giving the information are unknown. Looking at the
second factor, the tip does not list a date with the observations, it is made five
months prior to the request for the search warrant, and would not, on its own

support a search warrant. It was also uncorroborated by any kind of official
observation.
What's even more troubling is that the officer who signed the affidavit
apparently knew that the Defendant was not a suspect in the case that involved
the Riverdale storage shed. During the trial, Defendant's counsel questioned
Agent Machielson about the Riverdale storage shed case.

The following

discussion took place.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

In regard to the intelligence report that you were referring
toOkay.
-See that? You read a portion that Andrew [Defendant]
was telling the complainant he was somehow involved with
the marijuana that was found in the Riverdale storage shed.
You were familiar with that particular Riverdale storage
shed that was referred to in that complaint?
Absolutely.
You were involved in the bust or the seizure of the
marijuana found there is that 154 pounds, yes.
Mr. Lucero was never a suspect in that case; is that correct?
No, he was not.
In fact, you prosecuted and convicted somebody who was a
suspect in that case?
Absolutely.
It had nothing to do with Mr. Lucero?
Nope.
And at the time that you received this report here, you
understood that Mr. Lucero was not a suspect in that case?
As far as I knew, yeah. I had no idea that he would be
suspect in that.

(R. 494/248-49).

is

Even though an arrest had been made and Agent Machielson knew that
the Defendant wasn't a suspect in that case he included the information in the
affidavit and called it an "intelligence report" instead of what it was which was
an uncorroborated anonymous tip. The words "intelligence report" placed at
the front of the affidavit requesting a search warrant could only be there to
mislead the magistrate.
There were other statements in the search warrant that are not supported
by the record. The final paragraph of the affidavit states that the CI had
worked for several different strike force agents for several years. (See, R. 196).
When the CI was questioned by the prosecutor he was asked to describe how
he got involved with the strike force. (R. 493/164). He answered, "I went - first I went to Kim Allen. I kind of just had enough of it. . . . He was agitating
Ralph and I was just sick of it. . . . Pretty much just sick of it, you know, and so
I went and spoke - -1 spoke with Kim Allen [AP&P] and then I - -1 get - - He
called somebody on the strike force and then I was introduced to Jeff [Agent
Machielson]." (R. 493/164-65). The prosecutor asked him "Who did you first
meet with from the strike force?" He answered "I think it was Jeff [Agent
Machielson]." (R. 493/165).
The affidavit also failed to mention that the informant was being paid for
his information. One "who gains information through criminal activity or who
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is 'motivated . . . by pecuniary gain[,]... is lower on the reliability scale than a
citizen-informant." State v. McArthur, 996, P.2d 555, 564 (Utah Ct. App.
2000).
The entire affidavit was tainted by the misleading and omitted
information. The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Nielsen, 727 p.2d 188
(Utah 1986), that "the magistrate can only fulfill his constitutional function if
the information give to him is true; the obvious assumption behind the warrant
requirement is that the factual showing to support a finding of probable cause
will be truthful." Id. at 190.
In State v. Dable, 2003 UT 389 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court recently
reversed a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds
that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause.

The

affidavit omitted the fact that the informant gave his information after he had
been arrested for possessing controlled substances. This Court stated that "the
information regarding Utah Informant's arrest, as well as the date when he
gave them the information, was omitted from the affidavit, depriving the
magistrate of important information which might have assisted him in making
an independent evaluation of the informant's credibility in this matter." Id.
Because of the omitted information this Court found that "when
assessing the totality of the circumstances in this matter, we are unable to

accord the Utah Deputies full credibility or the Utah Informant any degree of
reliability." Id.
A hearing was held on Defendant's motion to suppress on July 10, 2002.
the trial judge denied the motion to suppress. He found that the affidavit was
sufficient to establish probable cause. The most significant factor was that the
police had a confidential make three separate purchases from the Defendant
and that they monitored and listened in on the conversations. The court found
that this alone established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
(R. 490/31-32).
The misleading information that was contained in the affidavit calls the
entire affidavit into question and taints the search warrant that was issued. For
these reasons the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motion to
suppress and his convictions for the offenses that resulted from the search
warrant should be reversed.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
WHEN
IT
REFUSED
TO
ALLOW
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY TO CROSS EXAMINE THE
STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A SPECIFIC INCIDENT
OF UNTRUTHFULNESS.

At the time of trial, Russ Hartley had entered into a plea in abeyance for a
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theft charge.

Defendant's attorney wanted to cross-examine him on

matter, but the trial judge prohibited it. Defense counsel argued that it
admissible under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 483/76).
Rule 608(b) reads;
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified. U.R.E. 608(b)(2002).
The rule is clear that specific instances of conduct may be inquired
into on cross-examination if they are probative or truthfulness or
untruthfulness. The trial judge abused his discretion on this issue by not
considering the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hartley's theft from his
former employer. In his ruling the trial judge stated;
I guess if you want to find a case for me that's right on point that
says
firing
somebody
for
embezzlement
constitutes
untruthfulness, I'll certainly take a look at it and reconsider in the
morning. But as it sits right now, I'm just not inclined to grant it.
I mean, otherwise it makes such a mockery out of this system that
says look, the only way you can attack is with convictions and
they've either got to be felonies or they have to involve acts of
dishonesty. I mean, I think it's fairly clear from the rules that we - we're very strict about attacking with specific instances. (R.
493/282).
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The trial judge also stated that "608 is really talking about opinion and
reputation evidence. Does he have a reputation in the community for
being dishonest or honest or truthful? I mean, you can parade all the
witnesses you want for that question." (R. 493/283).
The trial judge committed an abuse of discretion by applying the
requirements of Rule 609 to Rule 608 not gaining a full understanding of what
Rule 608 entails. He also committed an abuse of discretion when he didn't
consider the facts concerning Mr. Hartley's theft and whether or not they
constituted a specific instance of untruthfulness. The trial court also failed to
do a Rule 403 analysis of this potential evidence. In State v. Gomez, 63 P.3d
72 (Utah 2002), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] line of questioning on
cross-examination regarding a witness's specific instances of past conduct that
is probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
therefore admissible under rule 608(b), may still be limited or prohibited by the
trial court in its sound discretion under rule 403." Id. at 79.
When a party attempts to introduce evidence under Rule 608 a court's
job;
is to balance the probative value of the specific-instances
evidence against the potential dangers and costs of that evidence.
The trial court must (1) evaluate and consider the probative value
of the proffered testimony, that is, the extent to which the
proposed testimony is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
(2) determine the degree to which the proffered testimony may
30

tend to inflame or prejudice the jury, and (3) balance the first two
concerns to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the testimony's probative value.
Id.(citations and quotations omitted).
Defense counsel proffered what the evidence would show.
Defendant worked at Wheelwright Lumber.

The

He assisted people in getting

lumber from the back of the lumber yard, loaded it into their vehicles, took it to
their homes and did construction work on their homes. He did it without
repaying Wheelwright Lumber for the things that were taken out of the back of
their yard and without notifying them that he was doing the work for those
people. When he was confronted with it he said that he had receipts, but that
he couldn't find them. He denied any wrongdoing several times. When he was
finally confronted with what the people had told Wheelwright lumber he
confessed and asked for a chance to pay them back. (R. 493/281-82).
The Court didn't do a Rule 403 analysis. He simply denied them the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on that conduct. The trial judge at
one point stated that "there is a case out there . . . where an individual had been
convicted of theft, a misdemeanor theft. The court said just because you've
been convicted of a theft doesn't equate with dishonesty."

(R. 493/280)

Defense counsel agreed and told the trial judge that you "need to take a look at
the facts underlying it." (R. 493/280-81).

The proffered facts clearly show a specific instance of conduct that is
probative of the witness's truthfulness. He not only stole from his employer,
but when he was confronted on it he repeatedly lied. For this reason, the
Defendant should have been allowed to attack the witness's credibility by
cross-examining him about that specific incident.
Under Rule 609 the general rule is that theft ordinarily does not involve
dishonesty. See, State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 655-56 (Utah 1989). The
language in Rule 609 is different than the language in Rule 608. Rule 609 also
addresses prior convictions, while 608 addresses the witness credibility
concerning specific instances of untruthfulness. Nonetheless, under Rule 609
"a prior conviction for theft may be admissible under the rule 'if in fact the
crime was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means.'" Id. at 656 (citations
omitted).
Again, the Court failed to do an analysis of the proffered evidence under
Rules 608 and 403. Instead, he tried to prohibit it under Rule 609 by finding
that a plea in abeyance was not a conviction and that thefts are not crimes of
dishonesty. Since the trial court failed to apply the appropriate analysis, this
Court should find that there was an abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, the

failure to attack Russ Hartley's credibility was extremely prejudicial to the
Defendant. Mr. Hartley was the confidential informant who supplied most of
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the information to the strike force.

He was also the one who made three

purchases and told the strike force officers that it was the Defendant who he
bought the controlled substances from.

When the officers couldn't find

marijuana in Defendant's home they called Mr. Hartley for assistance. Mr.
Hartley's credibility was crucial to the State's case. If his credibility would
have been attacked to show that he has been untruthful in the past there is a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different outcome at
Defendant's trial.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a trial court to
Grant a defendant a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
U.R.Cr.P. 24 (2002).
Defendant filed a motion in writing requesting a new trial. The motion
outlined several errors that occurred during that trial that prejudiced the
Defendant.
A. THE STATE USED TESTIMONY THAT IT KNEW OR SHOULD
HAVE KNOWN WAS FALSE.
The State's main witness was the informant, Russ Hartley. During the
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trial Mr. Hartley testified under oath the he only used marijuana and that he
quit using it on November 11, 2001. (R. 493/168, 207-08, 211).
After the trial, defense counsel learned that Russ Hartley had testified at
the preliminary hearing in the case of State v. Kim Ray Teeter, Case No.
011901690, before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, held on August 29, 2001.
(R. 409). Russ Hartley was the confidential informant, Agent Machielson was
the investigating officer for the strike force, and Dean Saunders was the
prosecutor. These were the same exact players in the Defendant's case.
Mr. Hartley testified under oath at Kim Teeter's preliminary hearing that
he was actively using cocaine until the first week of December 2000. (R. 409).
This is in direct conflict with his testimony at Defendant's trial that he only
used marijuana and that he quit using on November 11, 2000.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that in a case when a prosecutor uses
testimony that he knows or should know is perjured, a conviction obtained by
the use of such perjured testimony, "is fundamentally unfair and must be set
aside, if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury." State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah
1980). Furthermore, the Court stated that good faith of the prosecution in such
a situation is irrelevant. Id. at 224.
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Mr. Hartley's testimony was key to the State's case. The prosecution of
the three counts of distribution hinged almost solely on Mr. Hartley's
testimony. There is a reasonable likelihood that if the jury knew that Mr.
Hartley used hard drugs and testified falsely about his use, his credibility
would have been affected.
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial
Judge stated that "I'm just not sure that it makes any difference in this case as
to how many different types of drugs he was using. He admitted on the stand
that he'd used drugs in the past, he had a drug problem." R. 499/2-3. The trial
judge also stated "I don't know that that really affects his credibility as to how
many different types of drugs he was using, and I just don't remember anybody
really pressing him hard as to the type of drug he was using." Id.
The problem with this reasoning is that the issue goes beyond whether or
not the witness used drugs, but to his credibility.

The only ones in the

courtroom who could have known that the Defendant testified falsely were the
prosecutor and the officer. They were the only ones present at both hearings.
If it would have come to the jury's attention that the witness had testified
differently at another hearing about both the drugs he was using and when he
quit using them his credibility for honesty would have been shot. It is very
likely that they would not have believed the rest of his testimony. Especially if
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they would have heard that he repeatedly lied when he was caught stealing
from his employer.
This Court should find that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
Defendant would have received a more favorable outcome had the error not
occurred. The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to find the trial court
abused its discretion by not granting him a new trial when it learned that the
State's main witness had committed perjury.
CONCLUSION
The numerous errors that occurred prior to and during Defendant's trial,
his right to a fair trial was denied. It is very likely that the Defendant would
have received a more favorable result if the jury was unaware of his prior
convictions and if they would have been aware of Russ Hartley's shady
character. Based on these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this
Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a newirial.
DATED t h i s ^ day of December, 2003.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSION OF LAW
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 011901619^

..
-yj

ANDREW LUCERO,
Judge Ernie W. Jones
Defendant.

The Court, having received the briefs of counsel and heard the arguments of counsel as to
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on January 29,2003, makes the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant received a fair trial.
2. The Jury was well aware that the CI, Mr. Hartley was a drug user. How many different
types of drugs he was using was not a central issue in this case and would not have affected his
credibility with the Jury.
3. Mr. Hartley's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case.

4. At the time that he testified, Mr. Hartley had not been convicted of the misdemeanor theft.
The fact that Mr. Hartley was convicted of a misdemeanor theft after his testimony in this case does
not provide a basis for a new trial.
5. This Court had ruled that the allegation that Mr. Hartley had been fired from his
employment for theft, was not admissible. Contrary to that ruling, defendant told the Jury at trial that
Mr. Hartley had been fired for theft. The Jury was well aware of that fact, even though inadmissible,
and any evidence concerning it would not have had, and did not have an effect on the Jury's verdict.
6. Luis Ackerman was properly excluded from testifying at trial. He indicated that his
information about Mr. Hartley's alleged dishonesty, was second hand information. Mr. Ackerman
testified from what he knew he did not have an opinion about Mr. Hartley honesty or dishonesty.
Based on those responses, the ruling that his testimony was inadmissible was proper.
7. The State provided all of the discovery that was required in this case. The defense had all
of the relevant information at the time of the trial and extensively used that to cross examine the
State's witnesses. The defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered because of
the alleged discovery violations.
8. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, and the demeanor of the witnesses when
they testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant received a fair trial.
2. The rulings of the Court, that the evidence of Mr. Hartley's alleged firing for theft, and that
Mr. Ackerman's testimony was not admissible, were proper. Despite the Court's rulings to the
2
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contrary, defendant told the jury the information about Mr. Hartley anyway. All of that information
about Mr. Hartley would not have had, and did not have an effect on the verdict of the Jury.
3. The State provided proper discovery in this case.
4. Based on how the CI's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case, the
totality of the evidence, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified, there is no reasonable
likelihood that the outcome of the trial would not have been any different.
Approved as to form:

r\

VI^TOR/LAWRENCE
torney for Defendant

L/DEAN SAUNDERS
Deputy Weber County Attorney

ORDER
Wherefore, Defendant's Motion to for a new trial is Denied.

DATED this / g ?

day of B r a s s y , 2003.

/

^X
ERNIE W. JONES
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed findings was hand delivered or
mailed, postage pre-paid, to:
Victor Lawrence
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 510290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151

DATED this J _ day of February, 2003.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011901619 FS

ANDREW LUCERO,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ERNIE W. JONES
December 11, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 25, 1960
Video
CHARGES
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
- Disposition: 08/20/2002
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
- Disposition: 08/20/2002
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
• Disposition: 08/20/2002
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
• Disposition: 08/20/2002
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
- Disposition: 08/20/2002

TO DIST
Guilty
TO DIST
Guilty
TO DIST
Guilty
TO DIST
Guilty
TO DIST
Guilty

Page 1

C/S

2nd Degree Felony

C/S

1st Degree Felony

C/S

1st Degree Felony

C/S

1st Degree Felony

C/S

2nd Degree Felony

180

Case No: 011901619
Date:
Dec 11, 2002
HEARING
This is the time set for sentencing. Attorney Lawrence addresses
the Court and requests the defendant be ordered to complete a
diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison. Attorney Saunders
addresses the Court and argues that
the defendant should be committed to the Utah State Prison, to
commence forthwith. Mr. Saunders further argues that the defendant
not receive credit for time served up until the conviction on this
matter, as he was out on
bail in this matter, and subsequently taken into custody on two
separate witness tampering charges.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your
Page 2

Case No: 011901619
Date:
Dec 11, 2002
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The sentence on each first degree felony shall run concurrently,
but those sentences shall run consecutive with the second degree
felony sentences. The second degree felonies shall also run
concurrently, but consecutive to the first degree sentences.

Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 205 day(s) previously served.
Dated this

/ s

day of

/J^c^C^

20^_^rr

ERNIE W. JONES
4e
District Court Judde

T)-^^r^
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f 1 r*ci-

\
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ADDENDUM B

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENTS
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 011901619 FS

ANDREW LUCERO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ERNIE W. JONES
April 22, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 25, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
J042202
Tape Count: 9:15
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

2nd Degree Felony

2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

3. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

4. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

5. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony
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Case No: 011901619
Date:
Apr 22, 2002

HEARING
This is the time set for oral arguments on several motions filed
by the defense. Agent Macheilson is also present for this hearing.
Attorney Lawrence addresses the Court. Attorney Saunders responds.
The Court denies defendant's motion to quash in
relation to Agent Micheilson's testimony at preliminary hearing,
the defense has argued that the official transcript does not reflet
that Agent Micheilson was sworn prior to testifying. The Court
will review the video tape made that date, to
determine if he was in fact sworn. The Court takes this issue
under advisement, but indicates that if the video tapes shows that
he was sworn, the Court will deny this motion. Counsel stipulate
that Agent Macheilson will have records searched
and agrees to turn over to the State any further report(s)
regarding information which may have been received about the
defendant. The information may excluse names of persons providing
the police tip. The State will then turn over any such
applicable reports to the defense. The Court rules that prior bad
acts convictions for like offenses are admissable at trial. The
State has filed a motion in limine. Attorney Saunders addresses
the Court. Attorney Lawrence responds. Russell Hartley
is sworn and testifies. Further oral arguments is continued to
May 1st at 4:00 p.m. The defendant is taken into custody at this
time, no bail due to further allegations of witness tampering.
This issue will be further addressed
at the May 1st hearing.
FURTHER ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled.
Date: 05/01/2002
Time: 04:01 p.m.
Location: 4th Floor Southeast
Second District Court
252 5 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: ERNIE W. JONES

Page 2 (last)

your Honor.

The dates on these prior convictions as they

relate to these offenses are about eight and a half years.
Your Honor, there is other precedent in the code that
talks about convictions being admitted less than 10 years old
and the Rules of Evidence, convictions if they're less than
10 years old and deal with a felony can come in.

And also

that rule, your Honor, talks about release from incarceration
from the conviction of that offense.

Mr. Lucero did go to

prison on those prior offenses, he did go back once on a
parole violations, so that lessens the time after he was
released from those, your Honor, from when he committed these
new offenses.
I think the other things, the other elements are set out.
Their main dispute was as to that.

So if the Court has

specific questions to that I'll respond to that.
THE COURT:

Let me just ask you:

Are you asking to

offer that as part of your case in chief or in rebuttal?
MR. SAUNDERS:

Yes, your Honor.

No, under 404B

that's part of your case in chief, your Honor, to show his
intent.

It also goes to establish the element of the prior

conviction to enhance these.

So that's what we're requesting

under 404(b) that this be admitted as part of our case in
chief.
THE COURT:

Well, normally on the enhancement when

we do a jury trial, we don't mention the enhancement as part

1

of the Case we just read the information.

2

MR. SAUNDERS:

Typically those are bifurcated and I

3

would agree if that were the only reason, the state would be

4

willing to do that.

5

specifically at issue in this case by saying he wasn't

6

involved in the possession of the drugs that were located in

7

his home.

8

like that where you can use prior convictions to show

9

somebody's intent, and we believe that we've established that

But your Honor, he's put his intent

The case law specifically talks about situations

10

clearly that he did have the prior convictions.

11

appropriate to admit those under the circumstance under the

12

case law, and we'd ask the Court to grant our motion in

13

limine allowing that, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

It's

Do you want to just take a minute and

15

tell me what the similarities are between the convictions

16

and —

17

MR. SAUNDERS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SAUNDERS:

I will, your Honor.

-- and the case in chief?
Again, in those cases, it was a

20

confidential informant that made the buys.

The substances

21

that we were again talking about were marijuana and

22

methamphetamine.

23

home, they were controlled buys by a strike force agency at

24

that point, and they're similar to that respect, your Honor.

25

In that case he also denied the fact that he had any

The buys were made from the defendant's

1

ownership of those drugs.

2

respects.

3

this case, his intent to possess that, his prior knowledge,

4

plan, preparation.

5

They're similar to all those

I think that placed clearly at issue his intent in

THE COURT:

Let me ask you from your standpoint:

6

Are you just intending to offer the certified convictions or

7

were you going to offer testimony?

8
9

MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, I believe that we would

be limited to offering the certified convictions to show

10

that.

11

specifically talk about those prior buys.

12

recollection.

13
14

I don't believe we could bring in officers to

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SAUNDERS:

16

THE COURT:

18

Anything else you

wanted to mention then?

15

17

All right.

Thatfs my

No, your Honor.

All right.

Mr. Lawrence, did you want

to respond?
MR. LAWRENCE:

Yes, Judge.

There is not the

19

similarity that counsel would ask the Court to accept.

The

20

prior conviction involved buys regarding marijuana.

21

methamphetamines were relative to that conviction, those

22

convictions.

No

That's the first thing.

23

The second thing, if the Court would allow counsel to use

24

this for this purpose, any time any defendant enters a denial

25

to the charges rather than an admission to the charges, all

1 ~>

of a sudden the issue of, well, now your intent comes into
play.

Wefve argued, in essence, that we're saying the best

they have is a constructive possession.

The difference is

with that other charge was that that was a place where he
clearly was staying with a roommate, this is not at his
residence.

So that coupled with the fact that this one

includes meth as well is different, number one.
Number two, they don't need to bring it into their case
in chief.

I think the Court is absolutely correct and I

think the Jamison case that counsel provided in their
response to my objection clearly articulates the procedure
just as you stated, that it should be after a conviction, if
and after a conviction, then it is presented at that stage.
Procedurally that's how it should be handled, not in their
case in chief.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But let me ask you:

If a

defendant is saying, hey, this is a mistake, I didn't have
anything to do with these drugs that are found in my home or
where I'm residing, and a jury learns that he's been
convicted before for the same thi ng, doesn 't that evidence go
directly to this ques tion of his intent?
MR. LAWRENCE :
his residence, Judge.

They have to prove first that it is
It is drastically different.

THE! COURT: Well, ri.ght.

I understand that.

we've got a defendant saying, hey , gee, I didn't have

But if

1

anything to do with the drugs, I don't know anything about

2

them, I just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong

3

time and then you have evidence showing that hefs made sales

4

of drugs on other occasions, doesn't that evidence go

5

directly to that issue?

6

MR. LAWRENCE:

I don't think it does, Judge. Again,

7

I'm arguing on behalf of my client because what they are

8

trying to do is quote, unquote, bootstrap this.

9

clearly —

it's different than the last case.

It's
We're holding

10

the last conviction over his head like the sword of Damocles,

11

and this case we're not entitled to do that.

12

show anything other than technically it gives them the

13

opportunity to enhance the charges.

14

the intent because it's different, Judge.

15

residence, the first time was his residence and that.

16

first time involved marijuana, this time involves marijuana

17

and methamphetamines.

18

use that conviction and bootstrap to show intent on this one.

19

THE COURT:

This doesn't

This isn't used to show
That was not his

It's clearly different.

I agree.

The

They can't

If the conviction had nothing

20

to do with selling or distributing drugs, for example, let's

21

say it was a theft conviction or a forgery, then it wouldn't

22

have any relevance.

But here they're trying to show a

23

I similarity between what he was convicted of in 1992 and what

24

| he's on trial for at this time in 2002, so isn't that a

25

I little different?

40

MR. LAWRENCE:
argue itfs not, Judge.

It is different, I'm not going to
But it's a quantum leap for them to

be able to do that, to bootstrap this in.
they're looking at it —

The fact that

they have this technical window of

opportunity that says, hey, we get to bring it in because of
this technicality.

But the Court can look at it and see that

you know what, we're clearly well beyond any notion of modus
operandi or of a pattern of what had happened here.

We're

almost to the 10-year period here where even the Court
wouldn't entertain this discussion.
THE COURT:

Well, did you take a look at the two

cases, the Ramirez and the Taylor case that were cited by the
prosecutor?

I mean, they seem to be fairly similar to what

we're talking about here, evidence involving prior
convictions for offenses that are similar to what he's on
trial for.

And in those cases, the court said that it was

all right to admit the convictions.
MR. LAWRENCE:

Yeah.

But in both of those cases it

was all right because I think the court was able to establish
that there is a nexus here and the issue is directly at hand
here.

In this case I'm saying that it's not.

burden first.

They have a

What they're trying to do is bootstrap

everything else into it.

The only thing that I can argue I

think is, Judge, in relation to time and the dissimilarity in
the two offenses, this one should not be bootstrapped into

4 O

Lhe present case, the prior convictions should not be
bootstrapped into the present case prior case.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, let me clarify —

MR. LAWRENCE:

That's all I have, Judge.

I!m

sorry.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, let me clarify one thing.

He was correct about the prior convictions.

I thought that

they involved methamphetamine as well but they involve
marijuana.

The similarity there, your Honor, there was a

large quantity of marijuana that was found in that case.
There was almost a pound of marijuana that was found in this
case.

All evidence is that this was Mr. Lucerofs residence.

His girlfriend indicated that these drugs were his that he
had sold from the house in the past.

This isn't in a

constructive possession case as far as that goes.

Your

Honor, these offenses are similar, and based on the case laws
as the court cited, the admission is appropriate.
MR. LAWRENCE:
THE COURT:

Judge, brief response to

—

Go ahead.

MR. LAWRENCE:
the lack of similarity.

And that is and I!ll bring up again
The prior case, the prior

conviction, Mr. Lucero was arrested at his residence.
this case, there!s no question he was arrested at his

In

1

I residence which is not the place where the drugs were found.
And so therefs

2

He was transported to this place, Judge.

3

clearly a definite line of demarkation as far as any

4

similarity with these.

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, I think Ifm inclined

6

to grant the motion in limine at this point.

7

allow the state to introduce evidence to the prior

8

convictions only as to drugs, okay?

9

talking about distribution or possession of controlled

10

MR. SAUNDERS:

12

THE COURT:

That's correct.

And those took place I believe in

13

November and December of 1992?

14

MR. SAUNDERS:

15

THE COURT:

That's correct.

All right.

And the only thing you

intend to offer is just certified copies of the conviction?

17

MR. SAUNDERS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SAUNDERS:

20

THE COURT:

21

So I assume we're just

substances.

11

16

I'm going to

Yes.

Now, do you have the convictions?
We do, your Honor.

Have you given copies of those to

Mr. Lawrence so he can take a look at those?

22

MR. SAUNDERS:

We'll be happy to do that, your

23

I Honor, certified copies of those.

24

I those but we'll be happy to provide certified copies.

25

I do show on his rap sheet I think that we gave you a copy of.

I think he's aware of
They

1 O

THE COURT:

I just think based on the analysis in

State versus Taylor and State versus Ramirez that were cited
in the prosecutor's brief, it's just the similarities between
what he's on trial for and the prior convictions are close
enough here to —

obviously what a jury's trying to decide

here is whether or not the defendant's involved in the sale
or distribution of drugs. And I would think that somebody's
who's claiming that they just happened to be in the wrong
place at the wrong time, that's a little different situation
than somebody who has been involved in selling drugs or
distributing drugs in the past and now is on trial for the
same thing.

So I do think it's relevant in this case because

it goes to the question of state of mind and whether or not
he knew about the drugs in this particular case.

I'll grant

the motion under 404 (b) and to allow the state to introduce
the prior convictions.
All right.

Anything that we need to clarify about the

order as far as the prior convictions?
MR. SAUNDERS:
THE COURT:

I don't believe so, your Honor.

Okay.

MR. LAWRENCE:

No.

Mr. Lawrence anything else?
I think you've covered

everything, Judge.
THE COURT:

All right.

Any other motions that we

need to take up at this time or —
MR. SAUNDERS:

No motions, your Honor.

We'll
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FOUNDATION ABOUT WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED.

I THINK THAT WOULD BE

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION.
THE COURT:
Q.

OKAY.

(BY MR. LAWRENCE)

I'VE HEARD YOU TALK IN THE A

VERNACULAR, NOW I HEARD WHAT MR. HARTLEY TALKS (SIC) IS THAT
THE WAY YOU GUYS USUALLY TALK?
A.

RIGHT.
MR. LAWRENCE:

YOUR HONOR, I HAVE NO FURTHER

QUESTIONS FOR MR. LUCERO.
THE COURT: CROSS.
MR. SAUNDERS:

WOULD YOU LIKE TO START THAT NOW,

YOUR HONOR?
THE COURT:

YES.

MR. SAUNDERS:

LET'S GO AHEAD IF WE COULD.

OKAY,

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SAUNDERS:
Q.

MR. LUCERO, BACK IN 1993 YOU WERE CONVICTED OF THREE

COUNTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, CORRECT?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND ALSO ONE COUNT WITH A POSSESSION OF CONTROL SUBSTANCE

WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, CORRECT?
A.

RIGHT.

Q.

FOUR COUNTS ALTOGETHER.
MR. SAUNDERS:

HONOR?

MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR

168

THE COURT:
Q.

OKAY.

(BY MR. SAUNDERS)

SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS

STATE'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 17, IS THAT A TRUE AND
CORRECT COPY OF A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF THOSE COUNTS?
A.

WELL, IT SAYS IT IS BUT I'VE NEVER SAW THIS EITHER, BUT

YEAH.
Q.

BUT THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED, YOU WERE CONVICTED OF THOSE

FOUR COUNTS?
A.

RIGHT.

Q.

OKAY.

AND I THINK YOU INDICATED TO THE JURY THAT YOU

ENDED UP GOING TO PRISON FOR THAT, CORRECT?
A.

YES.
MR. SAUNDERS:

I'D MOVE INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S

EXHIBIT 17, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

ANY OBJECTION?

MR. LAWRENCE:

I THINK WE HAD --IF THE COURT WANTS

TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, HE'S CLEARLY IDENTIFIED HE CAN'T
IDENTIFY THE DOCUMENT.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. SAUNDERS:

WE ALSO HAVE THE CRIMINAL FILE HERE,

YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THAT AS
WELL.
THE COURT:

IS THAT A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE

CONVICTION?
MR. SAUNDERS:

WE DO.

ADDENDUM C
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MR. LAWRENCE:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

All right.

Based on the briefs that

I've taken a look at and also the arguments of counsel, I'm
going to deny the motion to quash the search warrant. As you
recall, a search warrant which has been signed by a judge is
presumed to be valid.
Taylor —

In this case it was signed by Judge

or at least starts off with the presumption the

search warrant is valid.
Second, the Court will find that the affidavit in this
case is sufficient to establish probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant.
fairly well written.

The affidavit I thought was

It starts off indicating that police

had received -- they called it an intelligence report. What
it is essentially is somebody has given them information
about people who are dealing drugs.
And the two areas that I thought were significant was
that they indicated Mr. Lucero hides drugs at the Tile Man,
which was his business at 1400 Washington Boulevard; and,
also, at his home located on Canyon Road, apartment number 2.
Then they indicated that they did some checking and found he
did have a criminal history, had several arrests for
possession of controlled substances, at least one in 1986.
And then third, and probably most significant, is the
fact that the police are able to have a confidential
informant go in, make three different purchases from the

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
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Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 395-1055

2ND DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IORSEAKJ i l WAHK VINT
The undersigned being first d\ il) sworn, deposes and says:
That the Affiant has reason to believe that;
That on the prcmisc(s) known as;
1120 CANYON RD., #2, OGDEN , UTAH: A two story single condominium that is brown in color, The
condominium has a garage that sits to the North . The front door faces North-East and is brown in color.
The condominium is designated number 2 and has the number in gold over the front door.
Ot t! t :: ] c, x ; n i i ; t": ' i: • ::!i • 1 nt1 : • i a ! lis] >anic i i mlc, 5f6 175 lbs,, with b lack hair and brown eyes. (D.O.B. 9-2560)

In the City of OGDEN, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described
as:
MARIJUANA, i) green leafy subsUncc in dried foi ITL
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags.
Materials for using marijuana:
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side,
2 Pipes, used to smoke marijuana,
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked.
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amenints sold.
in 1 fllXI[AMHili 1 AMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance.
Materials for packaging mcthamphctaminc, specifically small plastic baggier.
Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting mcthamphcbiminc,
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, minors for holding methamphetamine while
being snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines,
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine.
Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine.
That said property or evidence:
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
• Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
• Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense.
• Is evidence of i I legal conduct,
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant arc:
Search Warrant affidavit • PaR* 1

1O0
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Your affiant, Jeff Machiclson is a ;•< !icc officer with the Ogdcn Oil) P< ?!iee Department and hits been
employed as a police officer since March, 1998. Affiant is currently assigned as an Agent for the
Wcbcr/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. Your affiant graduated from Crown point High School in
Crown Point Indiana in March, 1991.Your affiant graduated from Utah Police Officer Standards and
Training Academy in February of 1997, Your Affiant has received numerous hours in narcotics training
including training in search warrant preparation and execution. Your affiant has successfully completed
the Utah Drug academy and the Regional Counter Drug Training Academy in Meridian, Mississippi.
Your affiant also has experience in instructing new police hires in narcotics identification, Your affiant
has received training and ! ins personal knowledge through his experience of the use, sales and
manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphctamincs, marijuana, heroin and other designer
drugs. Your affiant knows what items would most be found at a premise where there are suspects using,
selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and these items arc those that are to be searched for.
On (0-11-00 Your Affiant received an intelligence report that stated thai Andrew Ltiecro was dealing large
amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine. The report also said that Andrew was involved m a case where
Agent Bills, along with your Affiant, seized 154 pounds of marijuana from a Riverdalc storage shed. The report
also stated thai Andrew runs the "Tile Man" store located in the 1400 block of Washington Blv. The report Raid
fhui Andrew hides his narcotics a his home located at 1120 Canyon Rd. tfl and at the "Tile Man" store.

On 2-214) I V ( Rtr Affiant i cceived information from Officer V crkler that he had responded to the
"Tile Man" .More located at 1468 Washington Blv. Officer Verklcr made contact with Andrew Lucero who runs
the store, The call for sei vice was a suspcious cicurnstancc and no action WAS taken
Your A ffiant cheeked Andrew Lucero's criminal history and 1: < n n i i il .1 h li n s :iy : •
wd possession of a controlled substance dating back to 1986,
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Further grounds for issuance of a search war rant are attached hereto and n icorpui ated herein.
In February of 2001 your Affiant was contacted by a confidential informant (hereafter referred to as CI)
that marijuana could be purchased from Andrew Lucero at 1120 C a n y o n Rd 112. Your Affiant met with the
CI at a pre-arranged meeting spot atid the CI was searched with no contraband being found. Your Affiant
fitted the CI with an electronic monitoring device and given an amount of recorded Strike Force money. Your
Affiant followed the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd #2 never losing site of the CI. T h e CI entered the condominium
and Your Affiant hcsinl, via the electronic monitoring device, a discussion of price and quantity between the
CI and a male. The CI left the condominium and was followed by your Affiant to w meeting spot. Your
Affiant i\cvcv lost sight of the CI. At the meeting spot the CI turned over a plastic b a g g y that contained n
green leafy substance that Your Affiant recognized as marijuana. The Of stated that the male voice thai your
Affiant heard was Andrew I .uccro. The CI iilso said that Andrew Lucero sold the m a n juana to the CI.
In February of 2001 Your Affiant was contacted by the CI who said that m c i h u m p h e t a m i n c could be
purchased from Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd. #2. Your Affiant met with the C I at a pre-arranged
meeting spol and the CI was searched. N o contraband was; found. The CI \\ w. ; fitted with ar \ electronic
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monitoring device and #ivcn an a$£unt of recorded Strike Force money. Your Affiant followed the CI. to
1120 Canyon Rd. # 2 . Your Affiant never lost sight of the CI. The CI entered the condominium and your
Affiant heard the CI discuss price and quantity with a male voice identified as Andrew Lucero by the CI. The
CI left the condominium and your Affiant followed the CI to a meeting spot. Your Affiant never lost sight
of the CI. At the meeting spot the CI turned over a plastic baggy that contained an amount of an off-white
substance that your Affiant recognized as methamphetaminc. Your Affiant tested this substance in the type
A NIK field test an if showed a positive reaction for amphetamines. The CI told your Affiant that the sale was
conducted by Andrew Lucero, The CI also said that there is always a large amount of narcotics in the
condominium..
"Within the last 24 hours your Affiant COT jductcd a third controlled purchase of methamphetaminc from
Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd, #2, Your Affiant was contacted by the CI and we met at a pre-arranged
meeting spot. The CI was searched with no contraband being found. The CI was fitted with an electronic
monitoring device. The CI was also given an amount of recorded Strike Force money. Your Affiant followed
the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd. 112 never losing sight of the CI. The CI went into the condominium u left a short
time later. Your Affiant followed the CI to the meeting spot ,nevqr losing sight of the CI, where the CI turned
over an amount of a off white substance that your AffianL recognized as methamphetaminc. The substance
showed a positive reaction for amphetamines in the type A NIK field test kit. The CI said that the sale was
conducted by Andrew Lucero. The C! also stated that Andrew took the money from the sale and put it in his
pocket.

Your Affiant knows that distributers of i larcotics often coi iceal money and evidence on there persons.
Your Affiant also knows that Andrew Lucero is a heavy user of methamphetaminc. Your Affiant has been
told by the CT that Andrew appeared to be under the influence of narcotics on all three purchases, Your
Affiant knows, from training and experience, that narcotics users often conceal there personal use narcotics
and the paraphernalia to ingest them on their persons,

WHBllFTORn, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued
or night due to the following reasons:
During the controlled purchases your Affiant saw vehicles coming to 1120 Canyon Rd. itl. Your Affiant also
heard, via the electronic mentioning device, phone conversations from the suspect telling people to stop by the
house to purchase narcotics, Your Affiant knows, from training and experience, that if Police arc spotted
approaching the residence that the suspect may have time to flee or destroy evidence concealed in the
condominium, Your Affiant Believes that these individuals frequenting the hou.se would inform the suspect of
a police presence. Due to The location of the residence it will difficult for officers to approach. The residence
sit* very near to the main entrance of the complex and your Affiant knows that the suspect may sec Officers
approaching in the daylight hours and have time to destroy evidence,
It is further requested that the officer caccuiwv, tht -• aiu« ir p ' '^ i , «h * f " v
^<" .-This authority on
purpose because of the following reasons:
Your Affiant has evidence of past violent erirninal history on the suspect at this premise and a no noliee
entry is needed for the safety of the officers. Your Affiant cheeked the criminal history of Andrew Lucero and
found several arrests for assault, assault with injury and interfering with arrest. Your Affiant also found that
..•A T u. * s \i s.j^'ce'
-•--*"-» recent assaults that did not result in arrest.
r -u,;on from a confidential informant that the suspect at this location have
v>v * - , . r, ? l U
• a*:e th'-ea^ : ** i. f * ^ < " <' f police are to attempt to enter the premises, Your Affiant has received
• , : r - : (r
'spect does not like Police The suspect also has u past history of resisting
$C.ftrt:h Warrant
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arrest Your Affiant also beard, via tl^ejeclronic monitoring device, the suspect talking about previous assaults
and how he would conduct them,
Your Affiant believes that if given the opportunity the suspect may pose a threat to Officers attempting
to execute the search warrant, Your Affiant also knows, from training and experience, that the suspect could
barricade himself inside the condominium if given the opporiimiiy and therefore causing safety concerns for the
Officers.

Your Affiant believes that Andi ew Lucero 'is running an ongoing narcotics distribution operation from
1120 Canyon Rd. #2 . Your Affiant believes that this criminal activity will continue to be a threat to the
surrounding community if it is not stopped.
The CI has worked for several different Agents of the Strike Force for several years. The CI has
provided information that has led to several arrests and convictions for narcotics violations and seizures of
large quantities of narcotics. The CI has provided your Affiant with their full and correct information and
has made all appointments on time. The CI is a former drug user and is knowledgeable is the appearance,usc
and distribution of narcotics. The CI has maintained daily contact with your Affiant. The CI is not suspect in
this or any pending eases,
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EXHIBIT B

NARRATIVI'l FMR . CR- 00-0000021010

T-Case
Complainanti Refused
Suspect: Andrew Lucero
Lori Lucero
Address; 3 3 20 Canyon, Rrad tl •'
10/11/00; The comp reported the suspect/ Andrew Lucero, is dealing large
amounts of meth and marijuana. Andrew was telling the comp that he is some IIOW
involved with the marijauan that was found in the Riverdale storage shed*
Andrew runs The Tile Man on 13th and Washington. He drives a big blue Blazer
and hides his drugs under his ashtray and in his shock covers. Andrew keeps
hiH drugs at 112 0 Canyon Road #2 or at The Tile Man.
10/24/00
AKT

1 QQ

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENTS
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 011901619 FS

ANDREW LUCERO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ERNIE W. JONES
July 10, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
vennaw
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 25, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
J071002
Tape Count: 5:35
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

2nd Degree Felony

2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

3. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

4. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

5. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S

1st Degree Felony

Paae 1

0\ q

Case No: 011901619
Date:
Jul 10, 2002

HEARING
This is the time set for pre-trial conference and oral arguments
on defendants motion to suppress. The exclusionary rule is
invoked. Agent Machielson is sworn and testifies. Mr. Lawrence
makes closing arguments. Attorney Saunders makes
closing arguments. The Court denies the motion to suppress. The
court finds the search warrant was valid and the affidavit was
sufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant.
Jury trial is confirmed to go forward as scheduled.
This matter is continued one week for further hearing.
FURTHER PRE-TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 07/17/2002
Time: 02:06 p.m.
Location: 4th Floor Southeast
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Before Judge: ERNIE W. JONES

Pacre 2 (last)
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WAS, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CUTTER.
Q.

OKAY.

WHO DIRECTED YOU TO THE METHAMPHETAMINE THAT YOU

FOUND IN THE SEARCH WARRANT?
A.

LORI LUCERO.

Q.

OKAY.
MR. SAUNDERS:

I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS,

YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

ANYTHING ELSE?

MR. LAWRENCE:

JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR.

RECROSS-EXftMINZ\TICN
BY MR. LAWRENCE:
Q.

IN REGARD TO THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT THAT YOU WERE

REFERRING TO -A.

OKAY.

Q.

-- SEE THAT?

YOU READ A PORTION THAT ANDREW WAS TELLING

THE COMPLAINANT HE WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED WITH THE MARIJUANA
THAT WAS FOUND IN THE RIVERDALE STORAGE SHED.
YOU WERE FAMILIAR WITH THAT PARTICULAR RIVERDALE STORAGE
SHED THAT WAS REFERRED TO IN THAT COMPLAINT?
A.

ABSOLUTELY.

Q.

YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THE BUST OR THE SEIZURE OF THE

MARIJUANA FOUND THERE IS THAT -A.

154 POUNDS, YES.

Q.

MR. LUCERO WAS NEVER A SUSPECT IN THAT CASE; IS THAT

CORRECT?
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A.

NO, HE WAS NOT.

Q.

IN FACT, YOU PROSECUTED AND CONVICTED SOMEBODY WHO WAS A

SUSPECT IN THAT CASE?
A.

ABSOLUTELY.

Q.

IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH MR. LUCERO?

A.

NOPE.

Q.

AND AT THE TIME THAT YOU RECEIVED THIS REPORT HERE, YOU

UNDERSTOOD THAT MR. LUCERO WAS NOT A SUSPECT IN THAT CASE?
A.

AS FAR AS I KNEW, YEAH.

I HAD NO IDEA THAT HE WOULD BE

SUSPECT IN THAT.
Q.

THANK YOU.

A.

OTHER THAN WHAT THIS SAYS.

Q.

AND ON THE — ACTUALLY, THE SECOND PAGE, THE FOLLOWING

INTELLIGENT REPORT WAS LOCATED ON 4/22/01.

YOUR TESTIMONY

TODAY WAS THAT YOU JUST LOCATED THAT THIS YEAR, IT WAS ON
4/22/02?
A.

OKAY.

I'M SORRY, MR. LAWRENCE, I'M ABOUT DATED OUT SO

YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO SLOW DOWN FOR ME.
Q.

I'M JUST SAYING IF YOU LOOK —

WHAT DATE DID YOU STATE

THAT YOU LOCATED THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT?
A.

I STATED THAT I FOUND IT FOR —

FOR YOU ON 4/22/01.

AND I STATED I FOUND IT

IT SHOULD BE 4/22/02.

Q.

OKAY.

THAT'S JUST -- IT'S JUST NOT ACCURATE?

A.

IT'S A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

Q.

REGARDING THE BLIND SPOT FROM WHERE YOU SAW HIM GET TO

ADDENDUM D
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I'LL DENY THE MOTION AT THIS POINT.
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:
MR. BLAKELY:

OKAY.
OKAY.

NEXT, YOUR HONOR —

GO AHEAD.

NEXT, YOUR HONOR, WAS THE — THE

QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE COULD ASK ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. HARTLEY REGARDING SPECIFIC ACTS OF
DISHONESTY.

AND FOR THIS, YOUR HONOR, THERE NEEDS TO BE A

SEPARATION BETWEEN A CONVICTION AND THE ACT THAT UNDERLIES A
CONVICTION.
RULE 609 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE STATE THAT A
CONVICTION IS NOT GOING TO BE PROPER UNLESS IT INVOLVES AN
ACT OF DISHONESTY, OR IS A FELONY.
RULE 608 THOUGH — AND I'M READING FROM 608(B) ON
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT —

SAYS:

SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF

THE CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING OR
SUPPORTING THE WITNESS' CREDIBILITY, OTHER THAN CONVICTION OF
A CRIME AS PROVIDED IN RULE 609, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.

THEY MAY, HOWEVER, IN THE DISCRETION OF

THE COURT, IF PROBATIVE OF TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS BE
INQUIRED INTO ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, ONE,
CONCERNING THE WITNESS' CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR
UNTRUTHFULNESS; OR TWO, CONCERNING THE CHARACTER FOR
TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS OF ANOTHER WITNESS — THAT
PART DOESN'T APPLY.
IN GIVING THE TESTIMONY, WHETHER BY AN ACCUSED OR BY ANY
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OTHER WITNESS, DOES NOT OPERATE AS A WAIVER OF THE ACCUSED'S
OR THE WITNESS' PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN
EXAMINED -- OKAY.
I REALLY THINK, YOUR HONOR, THAT ACTS THAT UNDERLIE A
CONVICTION OR UNDERLIE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, AS LONG AS
THE COURT ACTION, BEING CHARGED WITH A CRIME, BEING CONVICTED
OF A CRIME, OR THAT A CRIMINAL CASE IS PENDING, CAN STILL BE
GOTTEN INTO UNDER RULE 608(B).
THE COURT:

BUT HE —

HE HASN'T BEEN CHARGED.

IT

WASN'T EVEN REPORTED TO THE POLICE, AT LEAST —
MR. BLAKELY:
POLICE.

ACTUALLY, IT WAS REPORTED TO THE

HE WAS CHARGED WITH THE THEFT AND THERE'S A PLEA IN

ABEYANCE IN EFFECT.

SO THE STATUS OF THE CASE IS STILL

PENDING.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

WE ALL KNOW HOW A PLEA IN

ABEYANCE WORKS, RIGHT?
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

WELL, YOUR HONOR -YOU ENTER A PLEA, AS LONG AS HE MEETS

THE CONDITIONS THEN IT'S DISMISSED.
MR. BLAKELY:

THERE IS NO CONVICTION.

AND IT HAS NOT BEEN DISMISSED YET.

THE COURT: RIGHT.
MR. BLAKELY:

BUT EVEN IF —

HE WAS WORKING FOR AN EMPLOYER.

LET'S SAY FOR INSTANCE

THEY FOUND THAT HE WAS

TAKING MONEY OUT OF THE TILL AND THEY FIRED HIM WITHOUT
CALLING THE POLICE.

IT'S GOING TO BE EXACTLY THE SAME TYPE
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OF INSTANCE AS WE HAVE HERE WHERE HE WAS FOUND STEALING ITEMS
FROM THE -- FROM THE STORE.

THEY CALLED THE POLICE, HE

CONFESSED THAT HE DID IT, AND THEY FIRED HIM AND ALSO FILED
CRIMINAL CHARGES.
THE COURT:

BUT THEN WHAT DID THIS PLEA IN ABEYANCE

DO?
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE -IF WE TELL A DEFENDANT THAT HE CAN ENTER

A PLEA AND THAT IF HE MEETS ALL THE CONDITIONS, AT THE END
THEN WE'RE GOING TO DISMISS THE CASE, THEN THIS ALL MEANS
NOTHING, RIGHT?
MR. BLAKELY:

THEN THERE'S NO —

WELL, THEN THERE'S

NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. BLAKELY:

THE —

THE EQUATION THAT I'D LIKE TO

MAKE IS IF A PERSON IS CHARGED WITH D.U.I., WITHIN 10 DAYS OF
RECEIVING THE D.U.I. HE CAN MAKE A WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO HAVE A HEARING ON WHETHER OR
NOT HIS LICENSE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED.

NOW, THAT D.U.I. CHARGE

COULD BE DISMISSED.
THE COURT: RIGHT.
MR. BLAKELY:

SAY THE OFFICER IS —

OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON, THAT CONVIC —

CAN'T BE LOCATED

THAT —

THAT CASE CAN

BE DISMISSED; HOWEVER, THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES CAN
STILL GO AHEAD AND SUSPEND HIS LICENSE FOR 90 DAYS.

THE TWO
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ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE.
IN MUCH THE SAME WAY, THE ACTS UNDERLYING A CRIMINAL
CASE, IN MY MIND, YOUR HONOR, IS —

IS THE TYPE OF THING

THAT'S LOOKED AT UNDER RULE 608, AS LONG AS WE AVOID ANY TYPE
OF A MENTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT
CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT THE CHARGES WERE, BUT RATHER LOOKED AT
THE FACTS UNDERLYING.
THE COURT:

BUT HOW DO YOU PROPOSE DOING THAT?

MR. BLAKELY:

SIMPLY ASK HIM IF HE EVER —

WHY HE

WAS LAID OFF FROM -- FROM WHEELWRIGHTS -THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

MR. BLAKELY:

LET'S —

-- WITH AN ADMONITION TO HIM BY THE

STATE THAT HE NOT MENTION ANYTHING REGARDING A CRIMINAL CASE.
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

LET'S SAY HE DENIES THAT HE

WAS FIRED FOR EMBEZZLING FUNDS, THEN HOW —
MR. BLAKELY:

THEN WE CAN'T DO ANYTHING MORE.

MR. LAWRENCE:
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

NOT WITH HIM.
NOT WITH HIM.

WELL, WITH ANYONE.

MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

WHAT DO YOU DO?

WE COULD CALL THE EMPLOYER.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN IT SAYS HERE

UNDER SUBSECTION 2 THOUGH THAT SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF THE
CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THE
WITNESS' CREDIBILITY, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS.
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WHAT DOES THAT MEAN TO YOU?
MR. BLAKELY:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, IT MEANS TO ME THAT

BRINGING IN ANY OTHER TYPE OF CRIME.

THE —

THE DRAFTERS OF

THIS RULE OF EVIDENCE COULD HAVE SAID OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS.
THEY DIDN'T SAY THAT.

THEY SAID OTHER THAN EXTRINSIC

EVIDENCE WHICH CAN COVER MORE THAN CONVICTIONS.
THE COURT:

NOW, THE OTHER QUESTION I HAVE IS YOU'RE

SAYING THAT IT GOES TO DISHONESTY.
MR. BLAKELY:

RIGHT.

THE COURT:

IF YOU LOOK AT 80 —

TALK ABOUT DISHONESTY.

OR 608, IT DOESN'T

THE ONLY TIME DISHONESTY COMES UP IS

IN 609.
MR. BLAKELY:

TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS.

THE COURT:

YOU THINK THEY MEAN THE SAME?

MR. BLAKELY:

NOT NECESSARILY.

THE COURT: RIGHT.
MR. BLAKELY:

NOT NECESSARY; HOWEVER, I DO THINK

THAT WE HAVE AN INSTANCE HERE OF UNTRUTHFULNESS.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

BUT THERE IS A CASE OUT THERE —

AND I DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT NAME OF IT BECAUSE I WAS KIND
OF SURPRISED BY IT -- WHERE AN INDIVIDUAL HAD BEEN CONVICTED
OF THEFT, A MISDEMEANOR THEFT.

THE COURT SAID JUST BECAUSE

YOU'VE BEEN CONVICTED OF A THEFT DOESN'T EQUATE WITH
DISHONESTY.
MR. BLAKELY:

TRUE.

YOU NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE
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FACTS UNDERLYING IT.
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

AND THAT'S WHY I'M SAYING, JUST

BECAUSE HE'S BEEN FIRED FOR EMBEZZLEMENT MAY NOT NECESSARILY
MEAN HE'S UNTRUTHFUL, BUT -MR. BLAKELY:

TRUE.

WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS CASE,

YOUR HONOR, AND LET ME GIVE YOU THE FACTS ON THIS.

HE WAS

WORKING FOR A —
MR. SAUNDERS:
YOUR HONOR.

WELL, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THIS,

THE FACTS FROM WHOM?

THE COURT:

WELL, LET —

LET ME HEAR HIM OUT. LET

ME HEAR WHAT HE HAS TO SAY AND THEN YOU'LL —

I'LL GIVE YOU A

CHANCE TO RESPOND.
MR. BLAKELY:

AND, YOUR HONOR, I'M PARAPHRASING THE

POLICE REPORT THAT I READ ON THIS CASE.
THE COURT: OKAY.
MR. BLAKELY:

MR. HARTLEY WAS WORKING —

WHAT'S THE

NAME OF IT?
MR. LAWRENCE:
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

WHEELWRIGHT.
FOR WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER.

OKAY.

MR. BLAKELY:

HE ASSISTED PEOPLE IN GETTING LUMBER

FROM THE BACK OF THE LUMBER YARD, LOADING IT INTO THEIR
VEHICLES, TAKING IT TO THEIR HOME, AND THEN DOING
CONSTRUCTION WORK ON THEIR HOME WITH THE MATERIALS THAT WAS
OBTAINED THERE.

HE DID IT WITHOUT REPAYING WHEELWRIGHT
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LUMBER FOR THE THINGS THAT WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE BACK OF
THEIR YARD, WITHOUT NOTIFYING THEM THAT HE WAS DOING THAT
WORK FOR THESE PEOPLE ON THEIR HOMES.
WHEN CONFRONTED WITH IT, HE SAID, OH, YES, I HAVE
RECEIPTS, I SIMPLY CAN'T FIND THEM.

DENIED, DENIED, DENIED,

SEVERAL TIMES. AND THEN FINALLY WHEN HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH
WHAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE PEOPLE THAT HE'D DONE WORK FOR
THEM, HE FINALLY CONFESSED AND SAID YES, I DID IT, JUST GIVE
ME A CHANCE TO PAY YOU BACK SO.
SO THERE WAS SPECIFIC -- SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF
UNTRUTHFULNESS THERE:

NUMBER ONE, BEING UNTRUTHFUL TO THE

PERSON THAT HE WAS GETTING THE LUMBER FOR AND DOING THE
PROJECTS FOR; NUMBER TWO, BEING UNTRUTHFUL TO HIS EMPLOYER IN
WHETHER OR NOT HE'D DONE IT.
THE COURT:

WELL, I GUESS IF YOU WANT TO FIND A CASE

FOR ME THAT'S RIGHT ON POINT THAT SAYS FIRING SOMEBODY FOR
EMBEZZLEMENT CONSTITUTES UNTRUTHFULNESS, I'LL CERTAINLY TAKE
A LOOK AT IT AND RECONSIDER IN THE MORNING.

BUT AS IT SITS

RIGHT NOW, I'M JUST NOT INCLINED TO GRANT IT.

I MEAN,

OTHERWISE IT MAKES SUCH A MOCKERY OUT OF THIS SYSTEM THAT
SAYS LOOK, THE ONLY WAY YOU CAN ATTACK IS WITH CONVICTIONS
AND THEY'VE EITHER GOT TO BE FELONIES OR THEY HAVE TO INVOLVE
ACTS OF DISHONESTY.

I MEAN, I THINK IT'S FAIRLY CLEAR FROM

THE RULES THAT WE -- WE'RE VERY STRICT ABOUT ATTACKING WITH
SPECIFIC INSTANCES.
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MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

UH-HUH.

AND THAT'S WHAT THIS IS.

YOU'RE — YOU

WANT TO BE ABLE TO ASK HIM WHY HE WAS FIRED FROM HIS
EMPLOYMENT AND YET THERE'S NO CONVICTION.

HAD HE BEEN

CONVICTED, IT WOULD BE A LOT EASIER.
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

UH-HUH.
BUT HE HASN'T BEEN.

IT'S A PLEA IN

ABEYANCE, RIGHT?
MR. BLAKELY:

THAT'S CORRECT.

THE COURT: OKAY.
MR. BLAKELY:

BUT —

BUT THEN IT BRINGS TO QUESTION

WHY WE HAVE RULE 608(B) IN ADDITION TO RULE 609.
THE COURT:

WELL, 6 -- 608 —

60 9 I THINK IS PRETTY

CLEAR.
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:
REPUTATION EVIDENCE.

RIGHT.
608 IS REALLY TALKING ABOUT OPINION AND
DOES HE HAVE A REPUTATION IN THE

COMMUNITY FOR BEING DISHONEST OR HONEST OR TRUTHFUL?

I MEAN,

YOU CAN PARADE ALL THE WITNESSES YOU WANT FOR THAT QUESTION.
MR. BLAKELY:
THE COURT:

OKAY.
BUT THEN WHEN WE GET DOWN TO SPECIFIC

CONDUCT UNDER (B), I THINK IT'S VERY NARROW ABOUT WHAT
SPECIFIC CONDUCT YOU CAN GO INTO.
SO LET ME HEAR FROM MR. SAUNDERS ON THAT MATTER.
MR. BLAKELY:

OKAY.
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MR. SAUNDERS:

YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE COURT'S

EXACTLY RIGHT THAT IT DOES SEEM TO BE UNFAIR AND I THINK
THAT'S WHY THE RULE WAS WRITTEN THIS WAY.

WHAT IT SAYS IS

THEY MAY, HOWEVER, IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT.
SO IF YOUR HONOR'S OPINION IS —

BASED ON WHAT YOU'VE

HEARD THAT YOUR FEELING IS THIS SHOULDN'T COME IN, THAT'S
WITHIN YOUR DISCRETION AND YOU CAN DECIDE —
THE COURT:
BOTHERED BY.

WELL, BUT I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I'M

THERE'S NO QUESTION CERTAINLY THE DEFENSE CAN

ASK QUESTIONS THAT DISCREDIT HIS CREDIBILITY.

I MEAN,

THAT -- HE'S FAIR GAME, HIS CREDIBILITY IS A BIG ISSUE HERE.
WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT IS THAT IT'S A PLEA IN ABEYANCE.
AND I KEEP THINKING THERE'S A FAIRLY RECENT CASE THAT TALKS
ABOUT HOW WE TREAT PLEA IN ABEYANCE CASES WHEN THEY'RE
STILL —
MR. SAUNDERS:

THEY'RE NOT CONSIDERED CONVICTIONS.

THE COURT:

STILL OUT THERE.

—

MR. BLAKELY:

RIGHT.

THEY'RE NOT CONVICTIONS.

I

AGREE, YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

AND I'M JUST TRYING TO FIGURE

OUT WHAT THE RAMIFICATION IS IF HE COMES IN AND ENTERS A PLEA
IN ABEYANCE AND THERE'S NO CONVICTION, HOW CAN WE THEN
CIRCUMVENT THAT AND SAY WELL, IT FALLS UNDER 608(B)?
THAT'S —

AND

THAT'S WHAT I'M HAVING TROUBLE WITH SO —
MR. BLAKELY:

MY ONLY CONCERN, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT
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IF WE FIND AN INSTANCE OF SPECIFIC UNTRUTHFUL CONDUCT —
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

MR. BLAKELY:

— AND WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT

THERE WERE CRIMINAL CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE WOULDN'T
THEN BE ABLE TO ASK IT.

BECAUSE IF THERE WERE CRIMINAL

CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE BETTER CHECK AND SEE IF
THERE'S A CONVICTION.
DO YOU SEE MY QUANDARY, YOUR HONOR?
THE COURT:
ALL RIGHT.

RIGHT.

I DO.

WELL, I'LL -- I'LL TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT

FOR THE TIME BEING.

I MEAN, INITIALLY I THINK I'VE DENIED

IT, BUT IF YOU WANT TO TAKE A LOOK AND SEE IF THERE'S ANY
CASE LAW OUT THERE, I'LL CERTAINLY RECONSIDER THE ISSUE.

BUT

AS IT STANDS RIGHT NOW, I'M JUST NOT INCLINED TO LET YOU GO
INTO THAT.
MR. BLAKELY:

OKAY.

AND I —

I BELIEVE THERE WAS

ONE ADDITIONAL MOTION.
THE COURT: OKAY.
MR. LAWRENCE:

THE OTHER THING, YOUR HONOR, I WANT

TO DO, I WANT TO RENEW —

I DID MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON

THE STATEMENTS THAT WERE ALLOWED IN THROUGH THE TAPE, CLOSE
ENOUGH AKIN TO THE WITNESS TAMPERING OF MR. HARTLEY, AND THE
VERY SPECIFIC COMMENTS ABOUT THREATENED MY LIFE AND THAT. I
THINK THE JURY IS TAINTED ON THAT.
MISTRIAL ON THAT BASIS.

SO I WOULD ASK FOR A

I THINK YOU HAD RULED, BUT WE WERE
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(COURT'S RULING)
THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

WELL, THANK YOU.

I — I

APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AND ALSO THE BRIEFS THAT
WERE SUBMITTED.
AS YOU KNOW, IN ORDER TO GRANT A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
THERE HAS TO BE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE OUTCOME
WOULD BE DIFFERENT.

AND, FRANKLY, AFTER HEARING THE ARGUMENT

AND LOOKING AT THE MEMORANDUMS, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT
THE -- THAT THERE'S A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD HERE THAT THE
OUTCOME WOULD BE ANY DIFFERENT IF WE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. I
MEAN, THE WHOLE CONCEPT IS TO GIVE A DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
NOBODY CAN EVER GET A PERFECT TRIAL.
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

THAT'S —

THAT'S JUST

AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT MR. LUCERO

GOT A FAIR TRIAL IN THIS CASE.
WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE ISSUES HERE THAT YOU'VE
RAISED ABOUT THE C.I., I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION
THAT EVERYBODY IN THIS COURTROOM KNEW THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT HAD USED DRUGS.

BUT I DON'T RECALL ANYBODY REALLY

PRESSING HIM ABOUT THE TYPE OF DRUG THAT HE WAS USING,
WHETHER IT WAS MARIJUANA, COCAINE, METHAMPHETAMINE, BUT IT
WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS A DRUG USER AT ONE POINT.
I'M JUST NOT SURE THAT IT MAKES ANY DIFFERENCE IN THIS
CASE AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE WAS USING.
HE ADMITTED ON THE STAND THAT HE'D USED DRUGS IN THE PAST, HE
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HAD A DRUG PROBLEM.

IN FACT, MY RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THAT'S

THE REASON HE CAME FORWARD.

THAT'S THE REASON HE CONTACTED

LAW ENFORCEMENT IS HE FELT LIKE HE HAD SOME RESPONSIBILITY TO
TRY TO HELP CORRECT THE PROBLEM, TO GET RID OF THE PEOPLE WHO
WERE SELLING DRUGS AND USING DRUGS.

AND HE JUST FELT LIKE IT

WAS HIS TURN AND HIS TIME TO COME FORWARD AND TRY TO DO THIS.
AND SO I JUST -- I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT REALLY AFFECTS
HIS CREDIBILITY AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE
WAS USING, AND I JUST DON'T REMEMBER ANYBODY REALLY PRESSING
HIM HARD AS TO THE TYPE OF DRUG HE WAS USING.
ON THE QUESTION ABOUT THE —

HIS CONVICTION FOR THEFT,

THE PROBLEM IS THAT AT THE TIME HE TESTIFIED, AT THE TIME OF
THE TRIAL HE HAD NO CONVICTION FOR THEFT.

HE HAD ENTERED A

GUILTY PLEA, BUT THAT PLEA HAD BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE BY THE
COURT SO THERE WAS NO CONVICTION.

AND SO WHEN HE GOT ON THE

WITNESS STAND, HE COULDN'T BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE
CONVICTION.

THERE WAS JUST NO WAY BECAUSE THERE IS NO

CONVICTION.
AND SO NOW, SOME MONTHS LATER WHEN HE MAY HAVE VIOLATED
THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT AND THE CONVICTION IS ENTERED, IF
THAT'S TRUE, EVERY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHO HAS A
CONVICTION THAT COMES DOWN AFTER THEY'VE TESTIFIED, WE'D HAVE
TO SET ASIDE THE CONVICTION AND START ALL OVER AGAIN.

BUT AT

THE TIME HE TESTIFIED -- I THINK THAT'S THE CRITICAL POINT.
WHEN HE TESTIFIED HE HAD NO FELONY CONVICTION FOR THEFT
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INVOLVING WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER.
AND THE OTHER THING IS —

I THINK MR. SAUNDERS POINTED

IT OUT -- EVEN AFTER I HAD SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT HE COULD
NOT BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THAT CONVICTION, THE DEFENDANT,
MR. LUCERO, GOT ON THE WITNESS STAND AND BLURTED IT OUT TO
THE JURY.

THIS JURY KNEW FULL WELL THAT THE REASON THE

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT HAD LOST HIS JOB IS BECAUSE HE WAS
STEALING AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER.
SO DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO KEEP IT OUT, MR. LUCERO,
FOR WHATEVER REASON, DECIDED TO LET THE JURY KNOW THAT.

SO

ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, THEY STILL KNEW ABOUT HIM BEING IN
TROUBLE AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER AND WHY HE LOST HIS JOB.
AND THEN FINALLY ON MR. ACKERMAN, THE REASON -- THERE'S
NO QUESTION THAT PEOPLE CAN GET ON THE WITNESS STAND AND
TESTIFY ABOUT SOMEBODY'S CREDIBILITY, BUT THEY'VE GOT TO KNOW
SOMETHING ABOUT THE PERSON.

AND MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT

MR. ACKERMAN KNEW ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, FIRSTHAND, ABOUT THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, AND SO FOR THAT
REASON I WASN'T GOING TO ALLOW HIM TO RENDER AN OPINION ABOUT
SOMEBODY THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW.
YEAH, THEY'D WORKED TOGETHER FOR SIX MONTHS, BUT WHEN HE
WAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH HIS REPUTATION
IN THE COMMUNITY FOR BEING TRUTHFUL AND HONEST, I THOUGHT HE
SAID:

I DON'T KNOW.

I CAN'T RENDER AN OPINION.

AND SO I THOUGHT IF THAT'S TRUE, I'M NOT GOING TO LET
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THIS GUY RENDER ANY KIND OF OPINION IF HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY
BASIS FOR IT.

SO THAT WAS THE REASON THAT I PRECLUDED

MR. ACKERMAN FROM TESTIFYING IS BECAUSE HE HAD NO PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE AS FAR AS REPUTATION.
SO FOR ALL OF THOSE REASONS, I'M GOING TO DENY THE
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AT THIS POINT.
MR. SAUNDERS:

WOULD YOU LIKE THE STATE TO PREPARE

THE FINDINGS?
THE COURT:

YES, WOULD YOU PREPARE AN ORDER TO THAT

EFFECT.
(COURT'S RULING CONCLUDES)
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